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AbstrAct: given the long-standing and deeply rooted intertwinement between reason and phi-
losophy, there is a pressing need to reappraise our operative conceptions of rationality and criti-
cal inquiry in the wake of the transition from foundationalism to postfoundationalism. for while 
opening up exciting new vistas, this transition poses perplexing problems regarding how we might 
go about justifying our knowledge claims without the possibility of recourse to incontrovertible 
foundations, indubitable starting points, or algorithmic procedures. the challenge is all the more 
acute given that the turn to language and intersubjectivity that characterises this transition has 
fostered the proliferation of a diversity of competing and allegedly self-validating worldviews, that 
render the encounter with difference an indispensable feature of the contemporary epistemologi-
cal landscape while reinforcing the threat of relativism and groundlessness. through engaging 
with the work of Jurgen Habermas, Hans-georg gadamer and Michel foucault, three theorists 
widely recognized as major contributors to the contemporary debate, the present paper responds 
to these problems by seeking to delineate the constitutive features of a dialogically-oriented con-
ception of rationality and critical inquiry capable of meeting postfoundationalist needs. in the 
process, it reinforces the advantages of the reading these theorists as complementary rather than 
as oppositional, as has typically been the case.
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given the long-standing and deeply rooted intertwinement between reason and 
philosophy, in the wake of the far-reaching philosophical paradigm shift from founda-
tionalism to postfoundationalism,1 there is a pressing need to reappraise our operative 
     1. for a succinct overview of the significance of this term as it is intended here, see g.b. Madison, 
‘Philosophy without foundations’, Reason Papers 16 (1991), especially pp. 15-29. as a designator for our 
contemporary philosophical situation, it seems preferable to the term ‘postmetaphysical’ used by Habermas 
and others. for while, as grondin observes, ‘there is perhaps no common denominator which has 
characterized the philosophy of the last two centuries more than its urge to surpass metaphysics’ (sources 
of Hermeneutics (albany, ny: suny Press, 1995), p. 16), the present paper endorses the hermeneutic 
contention that, as grondin again puts it, ‘through hermeneutics, a differentiated, more subtle, and more 
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conceptions of rationality and critical inquiry. through engaging with the work of Ju-
rgen Habermas, Hans-georg gadamer and Michel foucault, theorists widely recog-
nised as major contributors to the contemporary debate, the present paper responds 
to this need by seeking to delineate the constitutive features of a dialogically-oriented 
conception of rationality and critical inquiry commensurate with the defining charac-
teristics of our postfoundationalist situation. to set the scene, it will be helpful to begin 
by briefly reviewing some notable challenges posed by the transition from foundational-
ism to postfoundationalism. 
along with belief in indubitable foundations, a subject-object divide, a represen-
tational theory of knowledge, and adherence to ‘the ideal of a universal method’, the 
traditional foundationalist paradigm was characterized by the conviction that ‘human 
reason can completely free itself of bias, prejudice, and tradition’, and that ’by the power 
of self-reflection we can transcend our historical context and horizon and know things 
as they really are in themselves’.2 by contrast, the transition to postfoundationalism is 
marked by a loss of faith in these erstwhile certainties, with significant consequences for 
how we construe the epistemological project. thus, sustained challenges to traditional-
ist foundationalist presuppositions have resulted in a loss of faith not only in indubita-
ble foundations, but also in atemporal truths, superordinate legislative standpoints and 
infallible algorithmic procedures for adjudicating knowledge claims. Challenges to ‘the 
Cartesian paradigm of the solitary thinker’3 have resulted in a corresponding loss of 
faith in the monological subject as the indisputable fulcrum in the quest for knowledge 
and understanding, and in the correlative recognition of language and intersubjectivity 
as the media wherein we must proffer and seek to justify our knowledge claims. Cor-
relatively, the demise of traditional foundationalist certainties has been accompanied 
by a growing recognition of the historicity, finitude, and fallibility that characterise our 
inquiries, and of the correspondingly conditioned status of the epistemic resources at 
our disposal for the critical adjudication of proffered knowledge claims. thus, while 
opening up exciting new vistas, the transition from foundationalism to postfoundation-
alism also poses perplexing questions regarding how we might go about justifying our 
knowledge claims without the possibility of recourse to incontrovertible foundations, 
indubitable starting points, or algorithmic procedures. the challenge is all the more 
acute given that the turn to language and intersubjectivity that marks this transition has 
promoted the proliferation of what Habermas terms a ‘diversity of voices’, effectively, a 
diversity of competing worldviews, or conceptual frameworks, each viewing itself as self-
validating in its own right and correspondingly resistant to holding itself accountable to 
any forum beyond itself. 
it is against this background that the passage from foundationalism to postfounda-
dialogical understanding of metaphysics can be brought about’ (ibid., p. 17); and as delineated by Madison 
the term ‘postfoundationalist’ embodies this possibility.
     2. Cf. Richard bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism (Philadelphia: university of Pennsylvania Press, 
1983), p. 36. 
     3. for this apt designation, see thomas McCarthy, translator’s introduction to Habermas’s The Theory of  
Communicative Action, vol. 1 (boston: beacon Press, 1984), p. vii.
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tionalism ‘imposes’ on us ‘the obligation’ of ‘redefining what it means to be ‘rational”’.4 
to respond effectively, we need to make progress in formulating what Habermas aptly 
terms a ‘nondefeatist’ conception of rationality and critical inquiry, one that can accom-
modate the features that characterise our postfoundationalism situation while avoiding 
groundlessness and radical relativism. in this regard, we can derive some comfort from 
the fact that postfoundationalism is not yet tantamount to postmodernism, with its now 
familiar connotations of groundlessness, arbitrariness, and irrevocable relativism. ac-
cordingly, the demise of foundationalism need not entail the negation of the possibility 
of rational grounding, nor that ‘anything goes’. but to vindicate this contention, we need 
to make progress in delineating a conception of rationality and critical inquiry that in 
addition to securing its critical efficacy in the absence of indubitable foundations, can 
harness not only the historicity and finitude but also the pluralism and difference that 
characterise our postfoundationalist situation as resources for, rather than as barriers to, 
the situated critical appraisal of knowledge claims. 
to this end, in what follows i engage critically with the work of Jurgen Habermas, 
Hans-georg gadamer, and Michael foucault, three theorists widely regarded as major 
contributors to the ‘new conversation’ informing the contemporary debate about post-
foundationalist philosophy and its implications. notwithstanding significant differences 
in the texture and structure of their thought, there are numerous, though typically con-
cealed, points of interrelation and overlap in their respective approaches. in particular, 
the present analysis serves to confirm Richard bernstein’s assessment that when we think 
through what contemporary contributors to this debate are saying and try to discern a 
common thread running through this ‘new conversation’, ‘we are led back to the fragile, 
but persistent ‘ideal’ of dialogical communicative rationality’.5 for, although not appar-
ent at first sight, through engaging in an element of ‘destructive retrieve’,6 we can come 
to discern a significant dialogical undercurrent in their thinking, and on this basis make 
progress in delineating the constitutive features of a dialogically oriented conception of 
rationality and critical inquiry well suited to postfoundationalist needs. in so doing, both 
the merits and legitimacy of reading these theorists as complementary rather than as 
oppositional as has typically been the case, will also begin to come to the fore.7
     4. ‘Philosophy without foundations’, p. 27.
     5. The New Constellation (Cambridge: Polity, 1991), p. 52; see too pp. 48-50, 337; also Beyond Objectivism and 
Relativism, pp. 77-78, 172, 229-30. 
     6. as intended here, this term denotes a reappropriation of a thinker’s position in accordance with its 
constitutive features with a view to liberating possibilities inherent in that position not sufficiently developed 
nor perhaps explicitly highlighted by the theorist in question, while at the same time taking care to ensure 
that this reappropriation remains faithful to the original. for a systematic elucidation of this Heideggerian 
concept, see Joseph J. Kockelmans, ‘Destructive Retrieve and Hermeneutic Phenomenology’, Research in 
Phenomenology 7 (1977), pp. 106-37; for a succinct summary, see Kockelmans’s Heidegger and Science (washington, 
DC: university Press of america, 1985), especially pp. 59-62. 
     7. My treatment of these themes in the present paper is a condensed version of the more detailed 
analysis undertaken in part i of my recent monograph Rationality, Hermeneutics and Dialogue: Toward a Viable 
Postfoundationalist Account of  Rationality (aldershot: ashgate, 2005). in what follows, the reader is periodically 
referred to the longer work for a more extended analysis of specific issues.
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with these ends in view, it is now time to take stock of how critical engagement with 
Habermas can help advance our core project.
HabeRMas
given his commitment to redefining for our times what it means to be rational, the 
work of Jurgen Habermas presents itself as a natural starting point. what distinguishes 
Habermas’s contribution in particular is his acute awareness that the transition to post-
foundationalism requires us to sever our ties to the monological subject as the indisput-
able fulcrum for reason and knowledge in favour of embracing the turn to language and 
intersubjectivity as the requisite starting point for underwriting a ‘nondefeatist’ con-
ception of rationality. but while Habermas’s core intuition in this regard is of decisive 
significance for the present project, his contribution to ‘redefining what it means to be 
“rational”’ for our times embodies some telling shortcomings. 
especially problematic from the perspective of present concerns is his embrace of 
a set of ‘idealizing presuppositions’, posited as necessary to secure nondefeatism. al-
though avowedly counterfactual, the problem is that their idealised connotations are 
profoundly at odds with our acknowledged status as situated inquirers, with the result 
that they generate untenable tensions in a postfoundationalist theory of knowledge. as 
a corrective, there is a pressing need to replace them with regulative orientations more 
commensurate with our postfoundationalist status. to this end, we need to undertake a 
focussed critique of these ‘strong idealisations’ with a view to working out a more defen-
sible postfoundationalist alternative. fortunately, as we shall see, in the course of modi-
fying his position to better accommodate the situatedness, historicity, and fallibility that 
characterise our postfoundationalist situation, Habermas himself has provided us with 
some important guiding clues, without however going far enough in the requisite direc-
tion. in what follows, then, the aim will be to build on these guiding clues with a view to 
liberating possibilities inherent in his position but which remains masked by his idealis-
ing proclivities, thereby correcting for the weaknesses of his unduly idealised stance. in 
the process, it will become clear that to complete the break with the ‘philosophy of the 
subject’ which motivated his ‘communicative turn’ from the outset in a manner that can 
liberate liberating the potential for situated learning that lies at the heart of his commu-
nicative project, a dialogical reappropriation of Habermas’s discursive stance is needed. 
on this basis, a critique of the Habermasian strong idealisations can provide us with a 
preliminary specification of the constitutive features of a more defensible postfounda-
tionalist alternative, one that can be refined and extended in the sections that follow. as 
a step in this direction, it is now time to embark on a focussed critique of the postulated 
unconditionality of truth claims, the first of the problematic idealisations. 
from early on, an emphasis on the unconditionality of validity claims, and of truth 
claims in particular, has figured prominently in Habermas’s thinking, and with quali-
fications continues to do so in his more recent writings.8 as in the case of his other 
     8. see, e.g., The Philosophical Discourse of  Modernity, pp. 322-23; cf. Justification and Application, trans. Ciaran 
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idealisations, Habermas defends the postulation of unconditionality primarily on the 
grounds that it is necessary to secure nondefeatism under postfoundationalist condi-
tions. essentially, he maintains that without recourse to a truth standard that ‘”blots 
out” space and time’ and ‘bursts every provinciality asunder’,9 it would not be possible to 
secure the nondefeatism of critical reason in the face of the ‘contextualist threat’ deriv-
ing from the diversity of allegedly self-validating paradigms, linguistic formations, and 
worldviews that proliferate in the wake of the ‘linguistic turn’ which characterises the 
transition to postfoundationalism.10 as considered further below, Habermas insists that 
the presupposition of unconditionality is needed to ensure that knowledge claims are 
held open to rigorous critical scrutiny in an indefinitely extended array of appropriately 
constituted forums of intersubjectivity, as he maintains is required to secure grounding 
under postfoundationalist conditions. on the debit side, however, this ‘strong idealisa-
tion’ conflicts sharply with our acknowledged postfoundationalist status as situated and 
fallible inquirers, to the extent that it engenders unsustainable tensions within an epis-
temological stance committed to meeting postfoundationalist needs. at a minimum, it 
constitutes what thomas McCarthy terms ‘a potentially misleading hypostatization’,11 
effectively limiting the capacity of Habermas’s communicative stance to do justice to 
the parameters of our postfoundationalist situation. as a corrective, building on guiding 
clues provided by Habermas himself, the following short critique makes the case for an 
appropriately detranscendentalised alternative that can secure his nondefeatist aims by 
building on the strengths of his communicative stance while minimising its weaknesses. 
from a postfoundationalist perspective, a first major problem with the postulation 
of unconditionality is that, although avowedly counterfactual, it can hardly fail to con-
note the ideal of attaining a neutral, atemporal standpoint from which the uncondi-
tioned truth of the matter might be unequivocally ascertained and asserted, a possibility 
that is simply not available to us as situated, finite inquirers. Correlatively, in masking 
the inherently conditioned status of the truth claims on which we must rely in practice, it 
deflects attention away from the resources that we, as situated inquirers, actually have at 
our disposal in a postfoundationalist context for the critical appraisal of truth and other 
validity claims. to his credit, Habermas has increasingly sought to distance himself 
from these idealised connotations, acknowledging that ‘the extramundane perspective 
of a god’s-eye view’ constitutes a perspective that ‘is radically different from the lines 
of sight belonging to innerworldly participants and observers’.12 indeed, he has gone so 
far as to explicitly acknowledge that our actual concern needs to be with claims that 
are ‘held to be true here and now’,13 and hence with what has been termed ‘warranted 
Cronin (Cambridge, Ma: Mit Press, 1993), pp. 145-46; 164-65.
     9. Cf. The Philosophical Discourse of  Modernity, pp. 322-23.
     10. for a developed treatment of this theme, see further Postmetaphysical Thinking, trans. william M. 
Hohengarten. (Cambridge, Ma: Mit Press, 1992), especially ch. 6.
     11. see David C. Hoy and thomas McCarthy, Critical Theory (oxford: blackwell, 1994), p. 76.
     12. Cf. Postmetaphysical Thinking, p. 145.
     13. Cf. Postmetaphysical Thinking, pp. 137; ‘a Reply’, in Communicative Action, eds a. Honneth and H. Joas 
(Cambridge, Ma: Mit Press, 1991), pp. 231-32.
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assertability’. but in themselves these concessions are not enough to dispel the tensions 
generated by his continued embrace of this idealisation while simultaneously emphasis-
ing our status as inherently situated inquirers.14 by the same token, his erstwhile defence 
of unconditionality as integral to the very ‘grammar’ of the truth concept15 sounds in-
creasingly hollow and unconvincing in light of his increasingly explicit emphasis on the 
fallible and corrigible status of our truth claims. a similar assessment applies with regard 
to the connotations of immutability that inevitably also accrue to this idealisation. given 
Habermas’s avowed fallibilism as well as the need to acknowledge the inherent mutabil-
ity of our truth claims as they undergo sustained critical appraisal from diverse situated 
perspectives, the connotations of immutability generated by this idealisation are simply 
not defensible. Moreover, in masking the inherently conditioned and mutable status of 
the truth claims on which we must rely in practice, it threatens to undermine the fal-
libilistic learning process that the logic of Habermas’s position avowedly presupposes. 
importantly too, it needs to be recognised that, since it retains unconditionality as one 
of its poles,16 Habermas’s recourse to a ‘Janus-faced’ conception of truth cannot suffice to 
remedy this deficiency. instead, what needs to be acknowledged is that while our knowl-
edge claims reflect our best current estimation of the truth of the matter, they nonethe-
less represent no more than a partial and provisional understanding of the subject mat-
ter under investigation, an understanding that will need to be reconceptualized, if not 
transformed, as inquiry advances in response to critical input from a diversity of stand-
points and with shifts in our historico-cultural vantage point. as a corrective, we need 
to eschew this idealisation in favour of a regulative orientation that can do justice to the 
inherently conditioned status of the truth claims with which we must deal in practice, 
and which can thereby enable us to make better use of the discursive resources actually 
available to us for their situated critical appraisal in a postfoundationalist context. 
fortunately, despite the problems spawned by his continued endorsement of this 
‘strong idealisation’, in drawing attention to the ‘aporetic tension’ generated by ‘the pos-
sibility of distinguishing between what is true and what we hold to be true’, 17 Habermas 
has provided us with an important guiding clue as to how the nondefeatism of communi-
cative reason might be effectively secured by appropriately detranscendentalised means. 
that is to say, what actually needs to be presupposed to underwrite the nondefeatism of 
our truth claims in a postfoundationalist context is their context-transcendence, not their 
presumed unconditionality. as elaborated below, this ‘weaker’ regulative orientation is 
sufficient to achieve the envisaged effect of ensuring that they are held open to critical 
scrutiny in an indefinitely extended array of appropriately constituted intersubjective 
forums, thereby fulfilling the primary requirement that Habermas specifies as the ra-
     14. for Habermas’s acknowledgement of our situated status, see, e.g., The Philosophical Discourse of  Modernity, 
p. 322. see too Postmetaphysical Thinking, p. 146; also ‘Discourse ethics’, in Moral Consciousness and Communicative 
Action, trans. Christian lenhardt and shierry nicholsen (Cambridge, Ma: Mit Press, 1990), p. 92.
     15. see ‘a Reply’, p. 232; cf. Postmetaphysical Thinking, p. 138.
     16. see, e.g., The Philosophical Discourse of  Modernity, pp. 322-23; Postmetaphysical Thinking, p. 142.
     17. see in particular Postmetaphysical Thinking, pp. 138-39.  
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tionale for defending unconditionality.18 importantly too, this detranscendentalized al-
ternative has the merit of refocussing our attention on the dynamics and logic of the situ-
ated intersubjective processes whereby proffered truth claims must have their evidential 
credentials appraised in a postfoundationalist context,19 thereby better positioning us to 
adequately conceptualise the situated learning processes that, as Habermas recognises, 
are integral to rationality on a postfoundationalist analysis. the following short critique 
of Habermas’s long-standing valorisation of the concept of an ‘ideal speech situation’20 
will serve to reinforce this assessment, as well as extending our understanding of the 
constitutive features of a more defensible postfoundationalist alternative.
as in the case of unconditionality, the postulation of an ideal speech situation is 
inherently problematic in a postfoundationalist context firstly because it conjures up 
the ideal of attaining an unconditioned, ‘god’s-eye’ standpoint from whence the ac-
ceptability of truth claims could be conclusively established, unaffected by any of the 
situational constraints of the sort that, on a postfoundationalist analysis, are acknowl-
edged to condition our situated inquiries. in addition, it conveys a misleading sense 
of homogeneity among participants that serves to mask, if not negate, the diversity of 
standpoints that we, as situated inquirers, actually occupy. Hence, as considered further 
below, it fails to take adequate account of the impetus provided by the encounter with 
otherness and difference in motivating a situated process of mutual learning. by the 
same token, this idealisation can all too easily conjure up the possibility of a ready-made 
framework of commensuration capable of obliterating fundamental differences in per-
spective. in addition, it can connote the possibility of engaging in a single meta-discourse 
with the capacity to resolve at once all differences that might arise in localized contexts 
of inquiry. in this case too, to his credit, Habermas has increasingly sought to distance 
himself from these idealised connotations, emphasising that he harbours no illusions 
about the possibility of our attaining an idealised meta-standpoint such as would enable 
us both to transcend our conditioned status and resolve all differences in perspective 
deriving therefrom. instead, he acknowledges that whatever outcome is achieved will, 
as simone Chambers perceptively puts it, inevitably be ‘the cumulative product of many 
     18. see, e.g., Justification and Application, pp. 145-46, 164-65; The Philosophical Discourse of  Modernity, pp. 322-
23, 408-409, n. 28.
     19. Cf. Hoy and McCarthy, Critical Theory, pp. 75-76. 
     20. in introducing his theory of communicative competence, a forerunner of the theory of communicative 
action, Habermas already asserts that ‘the design of an ideal speech situation is necessarily implied with 
the structure of potential speech’ (‘towards a theory of Communicative Competence’, Inquiry 13 (1970), p. 
372). but it is in ‘Wahrheitstheorien’ (in Wirklichkeit und Reflexion, ed. H. fahrenbach (Pfullingen: neske, 1973), 
pp. 211-65—not available in english translation) that Habermas presents the most developed statement 
of his conception of the ideal speech situation. for the background to, and rationale for, this problematic 
idealization, see McCarthy, The Critical Theory of  Jurgen Habermas (Cambridge, Ma: Mit Press, 1978), ch. 
4.2, especially pp. 306-10; also Rick Roderick (1986), Habermas and the Foundations of  Critical Theory (new 
york: st. Martin’s Press, 1986), ch. 3, especially pp.73-79. for an incisive expose and early critique, see 
too John thompson, ‘universal Pragmatics’, in Habermas: Critical Debates, eds J. thompson and D. Held 
(london: Macmillan, 1982), pp. 116-33. for a succinct overview of early criticisms, see Roderick, Habermas 
and the Foundations of  Critical Theory, pp. 85-86. 
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crisscrossing conversations over time’.21 but while stopping short of breaking completely 
with this problematic idealisation, Habermas has again provided us with an important 
guiding clue as to how the requirements embedded in the ideal speech situation might 
be appropriately specified in detranscendentalised terms. in particular, he has made 
it clear that the ideal speech situation is intended to function primarily as a shorthand 
summary of the conditions needing to be satisfied if the forums of intersubjectivity in 
which our knowledge claims are tested are appropriately structured so as to ensure the 
rationality and objectivity of this process and its outcomes. More specifically, as a pre-
condition for underwriting the rationality and objectivity of proffered knowledge claims, 
he has highlighted the need for these forums to be so structured as to incorporate the 
argumentative ground rules needed to ensure the rigorous critical appraisal of claim 
and counterclaim.22 in addition, in endorsing the toulmin model of argumentation, he 
has gone some ways toward delineating the argumentative procedures that he believes 
are needed to regulate the situated exchange of claim and counterclaim in a manner 
conducive to underwriting the principled advancement of understanding about the sub-
ject matter under investigation. but to render this proposal fully compatible with the 
requirements of a postfoundationalist theory of knowledge he would need to complete 
the break with this problematic idealisation. in addition, he would need to rethink the 
adequacy of the toulmin model as a template for the envisaged process of situated 
learning. for, notwithstanding its advantages over earlier, more decontextualised and 
homogenised models, being inherently monological in structure, the toulmin model 
of argumentation remains severely limited in its ability to underwrite a truly dialecti-
cal exchange of views of the sort that the situated appraisal of validity claims actually 
calls for in a postfoundationalist context,23 especially given the acknowledged diversity 
of viewpoints this encapsulates. since the Habermas/toulmin model is insufficiently 
dialectical to be capable of underwriting a process of ongoing position modification 
in light of sustainable objections and hence incapable of sustaining the type of situated 
learning process that postfoundationalist rationality ultimately calls for, we will need to 
look to our other theorists to see if they can provide a more fitting template. but, first, 
to complete our critique of the problematic idealisations, it is now time to consider the 
limitations inherent in Habermas’s embrace of idealised consensus as the overarching 
telos for postfoundationalist inquiry, with a view to establishing the need for a more de-
fensible alternative. 
Committed to the idea that ‘the condition of the truth of statements is the poten-
     21. Reasonable Democracy: Jurgen Habermas and the Politics of  Discourse (ithaca, ny: Cornell university Press, 
1996), p. 169.
     22. see, e.g., The Theory of  Communicative Action, vol. 1, p. 25; Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, pp. 
87-92; Justification and Application, p. 163.
     23. for Habermas’s endorsement of the toulmin model, see in particular The Theory of  Communicative 
Action, vol. 1, pp. 24-27. on the inherently monological status of this conception of argumentation and 
on the need to go beyond it in a dialectical, and indeed dialogical, direction, see further Mary Hesse, 
‘Habermas and the force of Dialectical argument’, History of  European Ideas 21 (1995), pp. 367-78; see too 
Paul Healy, ‘Critical Reasoning and Dialectical argument: an extension of toulmin’s approach’, Informal 
Logic, iX (1987), pp. 1-12.
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tial agreement of all others’,24 from early on Habermas has enshrined the concept of a 
rationally motivated consensus arrived at under ideal speech conditions as another cor-
nerstone of his position, and with modifications it too continues to figure prominently in 
his more recent writing.25 but as in the case of the other idealisations, given the tensions 
it engenders within a situated theory of knowledge, it too needs to be abandoned in 
favour of a guiding orientation more conducive to the requirements of our postfounda-
tionalist situation. since problems pertaining to its ideality and unconditionality have al-
ready been adequately canvassed in critiquing the other idealisations, this short critique 
focuses instead on problems specific to this idealisation. at bottom, the core problem 
is that in one-sidedly valorising consensuality Habermas radically underestimates the 
importance of disagreement and difference as indispensable stimuli for fuelling the ra-
tionally motivated advancement of understanding about a contested subject matter, not-
withstanding his acknowledgment of their pervasiveness as defining characteristics of 
our postfoundationalist situation. More specifically, the problem is that although Haber-
mas acknowledges the need to incorporate the possibility of disagreement as a condition 
for terming debate ‘rationally motivated’, he fails to accord it a positive or productive 
role in advancing the progress of inquiry. what is thereby overlooked is that the en-
counter with someone who disagrees, or who occupies a different discursive standpoint, 
constitutes our primary motivation to reassess, refine and, if need be, modify our initial 
claims about a contested subject matter. since the very real differences in perspective 
that differently situated participants bring to bear have an indispensable role to play in 
generating a rich and textured understanding of the subject matter under investigation, 
an adequate postfoundationalist approach must do justice to the fact that, far from 
constituting an inconvenient obstacle to be peremptorily overcome in the push toward 
consensus, the very progress of inquiry beyond its starting point depends in large meas-
ure on the impetus provided by the persistence of disagreement and difference.26 Conse-
quently, the validity and worth of the encounter with disagreement and difference must 
not be subordinated to the attainment of consensus, but must rather be acknowledged 
as integral to very structure, dynamics and logic of a mode of rational inquiry commen-
surate with postfoundationalist needs. Hence, a one-sided emphasis on consensus must 
give way to a regulative orientation more commensurate with the process of situated 
learning that Habermas rightly valorises as integral to postfoundationalist rationality. 
given that it connotes the prospect of attaining a rich and textured understanding of the 
subject matter, whose validity and worth transcend that of mere agreement, the aim of 
‘reaching understanding’ presents itself as a promising alternative.
     24. ‘Wahrheitstheorien’, p. 219; cited in McCarthy, The Critical Theory of  Jurgen Habermas, p. 299. as McCarthy 
notes (ibid.), this contention is a ‘much revised version’ of the Peircean dictum that: ‘the opinion which is 
fated to be agreed upon by all who investigate is what we mean by truth’.
     25. see, e.g. Justification and Application, pp. 164-65.
     26. see further Paul Healy, ‘argumentation, Rational Disagreement, and the Rhetorical Constitution of 
objectivity’, in Proceedings of  the Third ISSA Conference on Argumentation, vol. i: Perspectives and Approaches, eds 
frans van eemeren et al, (amsterdam: international Centre for the study of argumentation, 1995), pp. 
62-71.
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the tenability of this assessment is reinforced when we recall that, though eclipsed 
by his consensual proclivities, from early on Habermas has always valorised ‘reaching 
understanding’ as an ideal,27 but without sufficiently registering important distinctions 
between these interrelated concepts.28 Pending further elaboration in later sections, the 
main distinction at issue is that, unlike idealised consensus, a commitment to reaching 
understanding presupposes neither a univocal framework of commensuration nor the 
elimination of disagreement and difference as sine qua non for rationality. instead, what 
the aim of reaching understanding presupposes is that, through a principled exchange of 
good reasons emanating from a diversity of perspectives, each side progressively comes 
to better understand the views proffered by the other and remains committed to learn-
ing from their strengths. Hence in contrast to a one-sided emphasis on consensus and in 
keeping with Habermas’s thoroughgoing fallibilism, reaching understanding calls for the 
modification of initial positions under the impetus of the encounter with difference and 
embraces this as a prerequisite for the forging of an enlarged and enriched framework 
of understanding. while a measure of consensus may well be implicated this process of 
mutual learning, it is the latter rather than the former that has priority, such that there 
is no expectation that significant differences in perspective will give way to outright 
agreement even in the long run. the aim of reaching understanding is thus intended to 
correct for the limitations of a one-sided emphasis on agreement by fostering a genuine 
openness to learning from difference.
as noted, the aim of the foregoing short critique of key Habermasian ‘idealizing 
presuppositions’ has been to build on the strengths inherent in his communicative stance 
while correcting for its weaknesses, with a view to making progress in delineating the 
constitutive features of a conception of rationality better attuned to postfoundationalist 
needs. Proceeding thus, i have sought to establish that to secure nondefeatism in a man-
ner commensurate with the parameters of our postfoundationalist situation, the postu-
lation of unconditionality needs to give way to the embrace of a robust context-tran-
scendent truth standard which, in virtue of preserving the ‘aporetic tension’ inherent in 
the distinction between what is true and what we hold to be true, suffices to ensure that 
proffered knowledge claims are held open to critical scrutiny in an indefinitely extended 
array of situated forums. likewise, to meet the requirements for a situated theory of 
knowledge, the valorisation of an ideal speech situation needs to give way to the speci-
fication of an argumentatively grounded dialectical procedure for the rigorous critical 
appraisal of knowledge claims in appropriately constituted intersubjective forums. Cor-
relatively, in a postfoundationalist context characterised by pluralism and difference, 
the postulation of idealised consensus as the anticipated outcome for situated rational 
inquiry needs to give way to the aim of ‘reaching understanding’ about a contested 
subject matter under the impetus provided by a principled exchange of good reasons by 
diversely situated participants. in its favour this move toward a detranscendentalised re-
     27. see, e.g., his ‘universal Pragmatics’ in Communication and the Evolution of  Society, trans. thomas McCarthy 
(boston beacon Press, 1979), p. 1; The Theory of  Communicative Action, vol. 1, p. 288.
     28. Cf. Hoy and McCarthy, Critical Theory, pp. 180, 181. 
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appropriation of the Habermasian idealisations has the virtue of liberating the potential 
for situated, dialogical learning inherent in Habermas’s position but typically masked 
by the problematic idealisations. Moreover, given that it is motivated by the need to 
overcome untenable tensions within his position, this dialogical reappropriation cannot 
easily be dismissed as an external imposition. instead, it emerges as needed to fulfil the 
very aims that motivated Habermas’s ‘communicative turn’ from the outset. 
the critique of the Habermasian idealisations thus provides us with an invalua-
ble starting point for our investigation into the constitutive features of an appropriately 
grounded postfoundationalist conception of rationally motivated critical inquiry, gen-
erating insights that can be tested, extended and refined through engagement with our 
other theorists. given its sensitivity to the ways in which our historico-cultural situat-
edness inevitably conditions our ability to engage in a situated learning process of the 
sort prefigured in the foregoing, we next need to take stock of what we can learn from 
Hans-georg gadamer about the hermeneutic dimension of inquiry with a view to as-
certaining how this might contribute to advancing our core project. 
gaDaMeR
More specifically, in this section the aim is to show that gadamer’s philosophical 
hermeneutics can provide a needed corrective for Habermas’s ‘highly abstract concept 
of coercion-free discourse which totally loses sight of the real conditions of human prax-
is’.29 in particular, it can do so in virtue of his vindication of the intrinsically situated and 
contextual character of human understanding and the inherently interrogative and de-
velopmental conception of inquiry to which it gives rise, whereby the attainment of each 
new level of understanding opens up new horizons for investigation, as does each shift 
in historical perspective. given these and related characteristics, it has much to offer as 
a template for a dialogical mode of inquiry well attuned to postfoundationalist needs, 
even if to foreground the extent of gadamer’s contribution there is a need to engage in 
an element of ‘destructive retrieve’, informed by the debate with Habermas. to this end, 
it will be productive to begin by reprising gadamer’s critique of the Habermasian ideal 
speech situation, as a prelude to exploring the inherently situated and dialogical alter-
native it opens up. in the process, it will become clear that notwithstanding its avowed 
ontological orientation, fundamental epistemological questions lie at the heart of the 
hermeneutical project. 
from early on, gadamer has been a trenchant critic of the presupposition of an ide-
al speech situation, contending that a ‘standpoint that is beyond any standpoint … is a 
pure illusion’,30 and that it represents ‘an impossible ideal, similar to the “divine perspec-
tive” of a metaphysical theology’.31 Reinforcing the critique of the previous section, he 
     29. see gadamer’s ‘Reflections on My Philosophical Journey’, in The Philosophy of  Hans-Georg Gadamer, ed. 
lewis Hahn (la salle, il: open Court, 1997), p. 32.
     30. Truth and Method, 2nd ed., trans. Joel weinsheimer and Donald Marshall (new york: Continuum, 
1989), p. 376.
     31. Cited in soffer, ‘gadamer, Hermeneutics, and objectivity in interpretation’, Praxis International, 12 
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severely challenges the tenability of this presupposition on the grounds that it conjures 
up the possibility of attaining an atemporal, presuppositionless and aperspectival kind of 
knowing, which is simply not commensurate with our situated status. on hermeneutic 
premises, what such an idealisation overlooks in particular is the fact that ‘every subject 
matter we can understand exists in a Wirkungsgeschichte or ‘history of effects’ which makes 
our grasp of it part of an on-going process of “interpretation” and “dialogue” between 
our past and present’.32 since, even ideally, ‘we can never grasp the subject matter as 
such or all at once’,33 it does not make sense to postulate an idealised knowledge situa-
tion wherein we could come to complete reflective awareness of a given subject matter, 
and acquire wholly transparent and unconditioned knowledge of it. nor is it tenable, 
even ideally, to posit a vantage point, or speech situation, from which the merits of 
all contributions taken together could be comprehensively and transparently assessed.34 
Moreover, on hermeneutic principles, a fundamental contradiction is involved in posit-
ing as an ideal for inquiry a contextless knowledge situation that effectively presupposes 
the equivalence and interchangeability of all contributors and contributions, without re-
gard for fundamental differences in hermeneutic situation or standpoint. in effect, then, 
the postulation of an ideal speech situation is altogether untenable because it denies, or 
negates, the inherently temporalized, perspectival and processual character of human 
understanding and learning. furthermore, in overlooking the need to factor in new in-
sights and perspectives as these emerge with the progress of inquiry, it fails to do justice 
to the temporalized learning processes needed to underwrite the situated advancement 
of understanding. as a corrective, gadamer valorises a situated dialectical conception 
of inquiry better suited to the characteristics that define our postfoundationalist situ-
ation. thus, reflection on core features of the gadamerian template will enable us to 
gain invaluable additional insight into the constitutive features of a dialectical process 
of situated learning that can secure the principled advancement of understanding by 
non-idealized means. 
noteworthy in the first instance is the inherently interrogative character of his situ-
ated, dialectical conception of inquiry.35 eschewing a preoccupation with the validation 
of validity claims, gadamer is emphatic that genuine inquiry begins with a question--
along the lines of ‘how do matters stand with the subject matter?’—requiring that we 
look to the ‘thing itself ’ to ascertain how it ‘answers’. since to settle for a prefabricated 
answer would be to foreclose inquiry, the guiding question must remain open and con-
(1992), p. 243.
     32. see brice wachterhauser, ‘Prejudice, Reason and force, Philosophy, 63 (1988), p. 233.
     33. ibid., p. 232.
     34. gadamer’s rejection of the tenability of such a standpoint is evident from his vigorous opposition to 
the Hegelian concept of absolute understanding in favour of that of a ‘bad infinite’ which is always open to 
new experience and further insight (see further Robert Dostal, ‘the experience of truth for gadamer and 
Heidegger’, in Hermeneutics and Truth, ed. b. wachterhauser (evanston, il: northwestern university Press, 
1994), especially p. 58; also Rudiger bubner, ‘on the ground of understanding’, ibid., p. 75). 
     35. see Truth and Method, pp. 362-79. see too p. 269, where gadamer defines ‘the hermeneutical task’ as 
centered on ‘a questioning of things’. for a more extended defense of the ‘logical priority’ of the question, 
see gadamer’s ‘what is truth?’, in Hermeneutics and Truth, ed. wachterhauser, pp. 33-46.
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tinue to inform the progress of inquiry for its duration. Claims are of course made as 
inquiry advances but, importantly, their status is simply that of temporary answers, pro-
visionally asserted on the way to an enhanced, even transformed, understanding of the 
subject matter, which will emerge only through sustained engagement with the guiding 
question. this opening up of a question is, for gadamer, the decisive event initiating 
inquiry—just as the holding open of the question is an indispensable prerequisite for 
its continuance—essentially because in this way we acknowledge that we do not al-
ready know how matters stand regarding the subject matter, but are investigating with 
a view to finding out. Correlatively, given that our understanding of the subject matter 
is inevitably conditioned by inherited presuppositions of which we may not even be 
aware, we need to reserve judgment pending the surfacing and testing of the relevant 
presuppositions. in addition, acutely aware of the partial and perspectival character of 
human understanding, the hermeneutic stance reminds us that we are inevitably view-
ing the matter under investigation from a particular vantage point, and that others who 
occupy different hermeneutic standpoints will have different viewpoints and perspec-
tives to bring to bear—to which we need to remain open, if we truly aspire to attain a 
well-textured understanding of the subject matter commensurate with the possibilities 
afforded by our historico-cultural situation. thus invoking the socratic docta ignoratia,36 
gadamer reinforces the importance of ‘openness’ as a constitutive feature of an inher-
ently situated mode of inquiry oriented toward promoting the principled advancement 
of understanding.37 at the same time, however, recognising that ‘deciding the question 
is the path to knowledge’,38 he embraces the model of Platonic dialectic, grounded in 
a logic of question and answer, as the appropriate template for the situated learning 
process needed to underwrite the advancement of understanding on a principled basis. 
epitomising what is at issue here, Rudiger bubner provides us with the following insight-
ful characterization of the core dialectical model as valorised by gadamer:
Here, partners, with their different points of view, come together in a conversation 
governed by a subject matter of common interest. it is this orientation to a subject 
matter that leads both sides into a dialogical context and binds them for the course 
of the dialogue. the process is not motivated by the chance of success of a single, 
one-sided viewpoint, for its limits are already set by the resistance of the partner. 
what is much more definitive is that both sides are bound by the task of the actual 
elucidation of the subject matter. the process of dialogue, however provisional its 
outcome may be, consists in … coming-to-an-agreement-with-another, [a process 
that] always occurs in reference to a subject matter in terms of which we produce 
unity through dialogue.39
     36. Truth and Method, p. 362f.
     37. Moreover, as gadamer repeatedly affirms, there is an inherent interrelation between the ‘logical 
structure of openness’ and ‘the structure of the question’, implicit in all experience. for on hermeneutic 
premises, ‘we cannot have experiences without asking questions … from a logical point of view, the 
openness essential to experience is precisely the openness of being either this or that. it has the structure of 
a question’ (Truth and Method, p. 362). 
     38. Truth and Method, p. 364.
     39. ‘on the ground of understanding’, pp. 72-73.
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what this passage brings to the fore in particular is the centrality of structured 
conversation, or dialogue, as the route to attaining a well-textured understanding of the 
subject matter. in this connection, it alerts us to the conjoint, interactive character of the 
dialectical learning process at issue, the priority accorded the subject matter in leading 
the conversation forward, and its guiding aim of producing ‘unity through dialogue’. 
given their significance for our core project, these constitutive features warrant further 
elaboration, beginning with the hermeneutic centrality of dialogue. Here, the core con-
tention is that, as a corrective for the excesses of idealised discourse, the hermeneutic 
approach valorises the interrogative, dialogical structure of ‘talking something through’, 
with a view to progressively working out a (provisional) resolution to an open question, 
the answer to which was not known at the outset. a first noteworthy implication is that, 
notwithstanding his emphasis on the ‘event-like’ character of understanding, contrary 
to what has sometimes been maintained,40 it is not the ‘enlightening’ that is ultimately 
decisive when it comes to determining what to believe. instead, as Dostal and bubner 
attest,41 the ‘model of conversation is the primary model throughout gadamer’s work on 
the experience of truth’. understanding and truth come about ‘when we take the time 
to dwell on the matter at hand in conversation with another’.42 far from being decisive, 
then, the enlightening is simply a ‘moment’ in an ongoing dialectical process, whose 
overall aim is that of enriching, and indeed transforming, our understanding of the 
subject matter under investigation.43 importantly too, although often overlooked when 
the phenomenological roots of his thought are stressed, a commitment to an inherently 
dialogical conception of inquiry is no mere adjunct to gadamer’s thinking, but has its 
origins in the prior conviction that hermeneutic experience itself has ‘the structure of 
dialogical interplay with an other within a world’.44 a further noteworthy implication 
is that, notwithstanding his avowedly ontological orientation, gadamer by no means 
eschews the epistemological dimension of inquiry. Rather, in embracing the Platonic 
template, he affirms his commitment not only to holding proffered knowledge claims 
open to ongoing critical appraisal with a view to ensuring their attunement to the things 
themselves, but also to deciding questions on the basis of ‘the preponderance of reasons 
     40. thus for example, lawrence schmidt contends that that: ‘the experience of the enlightening 
perspective requires no further justification; it is enlightening. to ask what one should believe is to presume 
that what was experienced was not enlightening’ (‘uncovering Hermeneutic truth’, in The Specter of  
Relativism: Truth, Dialogue, and Phronesis in Philosophical Hermeneutics, ed. lawrence K. schmidt (evanston, il: 
northwestern university Press, 1995), p. 79). on this assessment, the ‘event-like’ character of understanding 
embodies a self-evident validity that does not stand in need of further justification; the enlightening simply 
is self-validating. 
     41. see Dostal, ‘the experience of truth’, especially pp. 58-62, and bubner, ‘the ground of understanding’, 
especially pp. 72-73.
     42. ‘the experience of truth’, p. 49.
     43. thus, as Dostal perceptively puts it, ‘the circle for gadamer is going back and forth between 
intuition and dialectic. the tension between these poles is precisely the engaging power of thought which 
characterizes his “between”’ (‘the experience of truth’, pp. 66-67).
     44. see further P. Christopher smith, Hermeneutics and Human Finitude (new york: fordham university 
Press, 1991), p. 191. 
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for the one and against the other possibility’.45 to advance our core project, we now need 
to take a closer look at how gadamer goes about discharging this commitment. to this 
end, we can productively take our cue from Christopher smith, who has performed an 
invaluable service in elucidating the ‘interrogative dialogical logic’ centrally at issue,46 
which for the most part remains implicit in gadamer’s own statement of his position. in 
so doing, we will also gain additional insight into the other constitutive features high-
lighted by bubner, namely, the conjoint, interactive character of this dialectical learning 
process, the priority accorded the subject matter in leading the conversation forward, 
and its guiding aim of producing ‘unity through dialogue’. above all, however, it will be-
come clear that, to be ‘completely true’ to its Platonic prototype, the appropriate model 
for the dialectical learning process whereby we make progress in ‘deciding the open 
question’ needs to be ‘what gadamer calls Gesprach’, that is to say, a cooperative process 
of ‘conversation and discussion’, oriented toward reaching understanding.47 
echoing bubner’s emphasis on mutuality, smith reinforces the hermeneutic com-
mitment to the conjoint, interrogative, exploration of a subject matter of common inter-
est whereby, as dialogue partners, we suspend a proclivity to assert the superiority of our 
preconceived views in favour of allowing ourselves to be led forward by the subject mat-
ter itself. thus, in contrast to the standard adversarial model of argumentation ‘in terms 
of claim and counterclaim each advocated by the individual party as the commitment-
less adversary of the other’, the hermeneutic approach is defined by its commitment 
to engaging with another in a conjoint inquiry into a topic of common interest and to 
following it together ‘where it would lead us’.48 on the hermeneutic template, then, in 
contrast to the standard adversarial model, the guiding orientation is that of ‘“Sich-Ver-
standigen in einer Sache”, reaching understanding in a matter’.49 Correlatively, in awareness 
that pending the further progress of inquiry, things ‘could either be this way or that’,50 
this ‘interrogative dialogical logic’ serves to remind us that that, ‘far from being stated as 
a “claim” at the beginning, the answer is always still to be arrived at’. in contrast to ‘the 
monological logic of demonstration’, then, the decisive consideration is that a question is 
‘opened up and properly delimited’.51 thereafter, the progress of inquiry is characterised 
by the interrogative, dialogical structure of ‘talking something through’,52 with a view to 
progressively working out a (provisional) resolution to an open question, the answer to 
which was not known at the outset. Moreover, this inherently interrogative orientation 
exerts its influence on the process of inquiry throughout all its phases, such that ‘not 
     45. Truth and Method, p. 364
     46. see P. Christopher smith, ‘toward a Discursive logic: gadamer and toulmin on inquiry and 
argument’, in The Specter of  Relativism, pp. 159-77. on the need for just such a conception of argumentation 
as a corrective for the limitations of the Habermas/toulmin model, see Healy, ‘Critical Reasoning and 
Dialectical argument’, pp. 1-12.
     47. Cf. ‘toward a Discursive logic’, p. 173.
     48. Cf. ‘toward a Discursive logic’, p. 176.
     49. ‘toward a Discursive logic’, p. 175.
     50. Cf. ‘toward a Discursive logic’, p. 167.
     51. Cf. ‘toward a Discursive logic’, pp. 165-66.
     52. ‘toward a Discursive logic’, p. 170.
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only the claim, but each of the links in the chain of argument supporting it are, with the 
exception of whatever happens to be the last, still in question, and even the last could 
always be called into question if the parties did not tacitly agree to let it stand’.53 
Complementing this inherently interrogative orientation and emphasis on conjoint 
inquiry, the hermeneutic approach accords priority to the subject matter itself in lead-
ing the conversation forward. thus as gadamer puts it, ‘something is placed at the 
centre … which the partners in dialogue both share, and concerning which they can 
exchange ideas with one another’.54 Commensurate with this guiding orientation and 
in contrast to the standard adversarial model, the hermeneutic template valorises ‘the 
very different goal of merging the horizons of only seemingly opposed viewpoints in a 
clarified consensus that neither party had wholly in view to begin with’.55 this shift in 
guiding orientation is needed to do justice to the core hermeneutic insight that partici-
pants who engage in situated dialogical inquiry ‘have limited horizons beyond which 
they cannot see at first. Hence an advance in understanding presupposes that something 
is heard and learned from another who sees things from a different angle, and that two 
or more perceptions come to augment each other in what gadamer calls a fusion of 
their horizons’.56 it thus reminds us that, as co-participants in this situated dialectical 
process, instead of seeking to secure agreement about the correctness of a proffered 
validity claim or trying to establish the superiority of our preconceived views, we should 
aspire to achieve a potentially transformative insight into the subject matter through a 
fusion of our horizons of understanding. as gadamer himself evocatively puts it, what 
is envisaged is that at the conclusion of ‘a successful conversation both [partners] come 
under the influence of the truth of the object and are thus bound to one another in a 
new community’.57 when properly engaged in, then, the process of situated dialogical 
inquiry culminates, not in the validation of validity claim, but in our ‘being transformed 
into a communion, in which we do not remain what we were’.58 importantly, however, 
this outcome will only eventuate provided we are prepared to forego a preoccupation 
with vindicating our own initial prejudgments in favour of remaining open to learning 
from the encounter with otherness to the extent that we are prepared ‘to experience the 
thou truly as a thou, i.e. not to overlook his claim but to really let him say something 
to us’.59 to this end, we must seriously attend to the views of our dialogue partners, to 
the extent that we allow our pre-existing views about the subject matter to be called into 
question and modified if the views of the other are seen to embody a greater claim to 
     53. ‘toward a Discursive logic’, p. 169.
     54. Truth and Method, p. 378.
     55. ‘toward a Discursive logic’, pp. 173-74.
     56. ‘toward a Discursive logic’, pp. 163-64.
     57. Truth and Method, p. 379.
     58. Truth and Method, p. 379.
     59. Truth and Method, p. 361. Cf. ibid., p. 385, where gadamer affirms that:
it belongs to every true conversation that each person opens himself to the other, truly accepts his point of 
view as valid and transposes himself into the other to such an extent that he understands not the particular 
individual but what he says. what is to be grasped is the substantive rightness of his opinion, so that we can 
be at one with each other on the subject matter.
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truth than our own.60 as gadamer has it, it is on this basis alone that we can anticipate 
the emergence of a ‘new community’, a ‘higher universality’, ‘in which we do not remain 
what we were’. 
but in this event it follows that, notwithstanding gadamer’s many references to 
‘agreement’, ‘consensus’ and the like, the hermeneutic approach ultimately valorises a 
considerably more open-ended, developmental conception of inquiry, oriented more to-
ward the transformative advancement of understanding than toward agreement about 
a preformed viewpoint. Hence, while the advancement of understanding does indeed 
entail ‘coming-to-an-agreement-with-another’, this should not be construed as neces-
sitating that all parties come to agree on any of the initially proffered positions. instead, 
as bubner aptly puts it, ‘in gadamer’s telling interpretation’, dialectical inquiry needs to 
be understood as anticipating ‘the overcoming of the given points of departure, thanks 
to the dominance of the subject matter that sustained the dialogue’. what is ‘definitive’, 
rather, is that ‘both sides are bound by the task of the actual elucidation of the subject 
matter’,61 and this in a sense that presupposes both the transcendence of initial viewpoints 
and a willingness to learn from those who occupy different hermeneutic standpoints. in 
short, as smith aptly puts it, what Sich-Verstandigen presupposes as telos of hermeneutic 
inquiry is, not consensus as such, but ‘an advance in understanding’ as a result of the 
fact that ‘something is heard and learned from another who sees things from a different 
angle, and that two or more perceptions come to augment each other in what gadamer 
calls a fusion of their horizons’.62 under these conditions, as gadamer evocatively puts 
it, ‘what emerges in its truth is the logos, which is neither mine nor yours’.63 ultimately, 
then, what the telos of ‘coming-to-an-agreement-with-another’ primarily presupposes is 
the emergence of a conjoint appreciation of the subject matter under investigation, one 
that represents a more adequate and textured understanding than that previously at the 
disposal of any of the dialogue partners, a co-understanding which, while forged out 
of the interplay of their views, goes considerably beyond that initially available to the 
individual participants. Hence, while it would not do to interpret Sich-Verstandigen as at 
odds with consensus, on hermeneutic premises the goal of reaching understanding in a 
sense that connotes the attainment of an enriched, even transformed, understanding of 
the subject matter under investigation ultimately warrants priority. accordingly, what 
is primarily called for is that we commit ourselves to a conjoint process of situated dia-
     60. Cf. Kathleen wright, ‘gadamer: the speculative structure of language’, in Hermeneutics and 
Modern Philosophy, ed. b. wachterhauser (albany, ny: suny Press, 1986), p. 201: in a genuine i-thou 
relationship, 
the i not only recognizes the thou to be a person but also listens to what the thou has to say. the i is 
open to the thou and to the truth of what the thou claims. Ready to experience the limitations of its 
own original understanding of that which is called into question by the thou, the i is a questioner open to 
questions; it is open-minded and prepared to change its mind. the truth is that which emerges in the course 
of this conversation. it is no longer that originally claimed by the i or that originally claimed by the thou, 
but rather that which emerges out of the give-and-take of conversation.
     61. ‘on the ground of understanding’, p. 73.
     62. ‘toward a Discursive logic’, pp. 163-64. 
     63. Truth and Method, p. 368. 
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lectical inquiry, such that, while it presupposes a certain ‘at oneness’ with our interlocu-
tors, necessitates that we forego easy agreement in the interests of attaining a rich and 
textured understanding of the previously inadequately understood subject matter. and 
importantly, being underwritten by a distinctive ‘interrogative dialogical logic’, there 
is nothing arbitrary about this emergence, or occurrence, of transformative insight. 
Rather, as epitomized by georgia warnke, it eventuates through a principled process of 
‘integration and appropriation’, whereby participants neither seek to defeat their inter-
locutors nor to bolster their own positions. instead, in keeping with the dialogical logic 
of dialectical inquiry, what is required is that ‘each participant takes account of the other 
opinions, attempts to show what is wrong and right with them as well as with her own 
position and thereby formulates, in concert with the others, a view that each recognizes 
to be closer to the truth than any of the original positions’.64 
finally, by way of consolidating its merits as a viable postfoundationalist template, it 
should be noted that, contrary to what some have claimed, the hermeneutic approach 
does not succumb to the criticism that it collapses ‘the ideal to the real’ in the sense of 
eschewing the need for, or possibility of, a regulative truth concept capable of giving 
impetus and direction to our critical endeavours.65 where such a criticism goes astray 
is in overlooking gadamer’s commitment to ‘the anticipation of completeness’, which 
functions as an indispensable hermeneutic resource for underwriting the quest for ob-
jectivity and truth. in the present context, suffice it to note that in embracing this con-
cept gadamer valorises ‘the complete truth’ as a core regulative ideal, enjoining that the 
hermeneutic inquirer be ‘guided by the constant transcendent expectations of meaning 
that proceed from the relation to the truth of what is being said’.66 Clearly, then, his 
eschewal of the problematic Habermasian idealisations does not cause him to neglect 
the need for a context-transcendent truth standard as a precondition for underwriting 
our situated inquiries. equally importantly, however, given the hermeneutic emphasis 
on situatedness, historicality, and the inherently open-ended character of inquiry, it is 
clear that gadamer’s references to the ‘complete truth’ must not be understood in a 
sense that connotes either his espousal of an unconditioned truth concept or of an ideal-
ized vantage point from whence the (complete) truth could be atemporally ascertained. 
Rather, in proffering a given interpretation what needs to be borne in mind is that is that 
far from exhausting the significance of the subject matter under investigation, it simply 
affords us one situated perspective on the complex whole toward which we are oriented 
in the effort to understand. nonetheless, in thus projecting an interpretation, we remain 
intrinsically related to the whole in the sense of the full range of (valid) interpretations 
that the subject matter can support.
as noted at the outset, the aim of our encounter with gadamer has been to establish 
that the hermeneutic template has a decisive contribution to make in advancing our 
core project while correcting for the limitations of the unduly idealised Habermasian 
     64. Gadamer: Hermeneutics, Tradition, and Reason (stanford: stanford university Press, 1987), p. 101.
     65. Cf. soffer, ‘gadamer, Hermeneutics, and objectivity in interpretation’, especially pp. 253-54.
     66. Truth and Method, p. 294.
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prototype. as we have seen, a first notable feature is the way in which the hermeneutic 
approach valorises a conception of inquiry that is continuous with our everyday con-
cerns and lifeworld involvements, thereby eschewing a separation between the domains 
of communicative interaction and (theoretical) discourse. in so doing, it alerts us to the 
fact that critical reason cannot secure its nondefeatism by negating its situatedness, but 
must rather secure its grounding by non-idealized means. More specifically, it apprises 
us that far from seeking to neutralise our prejudgments, we need to become more reflec-
tively aware of them and bring them actively into play, with a view to putting them to 
the test. Moreover, given our situated status, the surfacing and testing of prejudgments 
presuppose a process that, far from being absolute, presuppositionless or ideal is situ-
ated and perspectival, yielding outcomes that are finite, fallible and open to reapprais-
al. accordingly, hermeneutic thinking valorises an inherently interrogative approach, 
whereby inquiry begins, not with the assertion of a claim construed as representing the 
unequivocal truth of the matter about which all reasonable participants will, over time, 
come to agree, but with a question, a question that remains open and guides the in-
quiry for its duration and that always remains open to re-examination. in addition, the 
requirement of openness enjoins us, actively and vigorously, to test the cogency of our 
prejudgments in as many varied forums as possible, with a view to modifying our initial 
positions if our prejudgments are shown to be wanting. and notwithstanding its avow-
edly ontological orientation, philosophical hermeneutics does not eschew concern with 
procedures of critical appraisal. on the contrary, in embracing the model of Platonic 
dialectic gadamer clearly signals his commitment to deciding questions on the basis of 
‘the preponderance of reasons for the one and against the other possibility’, and provides 
us with a template for a situated learning process that can underwrite its development 
by non-idealized means. as we have seen, this template is characterised in particular by 
its commitment to the centrality of structured conversation, or dialogue, as the route to 
attaining a well-textured understanding of the subject matter. More specifically, it alerts 
us to the conjoint, interactive character of the dialectical learning process at issue, the 
priority accorded the subject matter in leading the conversation forward, and its guiding 
aim of producing ‘unity through dialogue’. in thus correcting for the limitations of the 
unduly idealised, static and monological Habermasian stance, the hermeneutic tem-
plate has the capacity to underwrite a developmental conception of inquiry that liber-
ates the potential for situated learning inherent in the Habermasian stance but inhibited 
by his idealising proclivities.
notwithstanding these decisive merits, it remains the case that our postfoundation-
alist situation poses still other challenges, most notably those of transgressing entrenched 
presuppositions and of accommodating the encounter with radical diversity and differ-
ence which gadamer’s relatively traditionalist approach is not especially well equipped 
to handle.67 in the next section, then, we turn to the consideration of Michel foucault’s 
     67. while a careful reading of Truth and Method makes it clear that gadamer does not neglect the themes 
of otherness and difference to the extent that is sometimes maintained, it is equally clear that the challenges 
posed by the encounter with radical diversity and difference do not figure prominently in his thinking.
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contribution to this debate to ascertain how it might enable us to better respond to these 
and related facets of our postfoundationalist situation.
fouCault
since the aim in the present section is to advance our core project by foregrounding 
facets of postfoundationalist critique overlooked or downplayed by our other theorists, 
it is not foucault’s treatment of power relations, predominant in much existing critical 
commentary, that achieves prominence here, but rather his problematising, transgres-
sive conception of inquiry and the light he sheds on the pluralistic, decentered, and 
contested character of contemporary forums of intersubjectivity. in thus alerting us to 
the problematising dimension of inquiry and in foregrounding the indispensable role 
that the encounter with difference has to play in promoting the potentially transforma-
tive advancement of understanding, foucault has a distinctive contribution to make 
toward advancing our core project, notwithstanding his reputation in some quarters as 
a radical relativist or irrationalist. accordingly, although necessarily circumscribed, the 
present analysis serves to reinforce alcoff’s assessment that far from being inherently 
anti-epistemological, as has frequently been claimed, foucault’s project has the potential 
‘to refashion rather than undermine epistemology and to move it onto more productive 
terrain’.68 to gain a sense of what is at issue in this regard in the present context, it will 
be productive to begin with a brief reflection on foucault’s distinctively problematising 
conception of critique and on the importance of the encounter with difference in stimu-
lating the transformative advancement of understanding before going to take stock of 
what we can learn from him about the constitution of the forums of intersubjectivity in 
which we must hold our knowledge claims open to appraisal in a postfoundationalist 
situation.
embracing the challenge of thinking differently, foucault eschews a preoccupation 
with validating what is already known in favour of a commitment to liberating new pos-
sibilities for thinking, doing, and being. in thus celebrating the activity of ‘limit testing’ 
aimed at ‘deconstructing necessity’, he presses the boundaries of the more conservative 
approaches we have thus far considered. in so doing, he goes beyond gadamer as well 
as Habermas in alerting us to the constricting effects that unreflective adherence to what 
is taken to be beyond question can have on our thinking, and hence to the need to be 
willing radically to call into question what are considered to be the ‘contemporary limits 
of the necessary’. in thus apprising us of the pervasive influence exerted by entrenched 
ways of thinking in delimiting what we take to be real as well as necessary, foucault 
goes further than either of our other theorists in promoting an inherently transformative 
conception of inquiry, dedicated to liberating new possibilities for thinking, doing and 
     68. see further linda alcoff, Real Knowing: New Versions of  the Coherence Theory (ithaca, ny: Cornell university 
Press, 1996), especially pp. 115-16. but while the present analysis reinforces alcoff’s overall assessment of his 
contribution, it foregrounds aspects of foucault’s thinking that challenge the boundaries of a coherentist 
reading of his work.
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being.69 Correlatively, he contributes decisively to our core project by apprising us of the 
importance of the encounter with difference in motivating the transformative advance-
ment of understanding. in particular, he highlights its potential to serve as a ‘contrastive 
foil’ with the capacity both to alert us to beliefs and presuppositions we were not aware 
of holding and to acquaint us with other hitherto unrecognized possibilities for thinking, 
doing, and being. He achieves this outcome by apprising us of the force of the concealed 
presuppositions that condition and restrict our thinking, and of the correlative need to 
remain open to new possibilities that inhere in other ways of thinking and doing that 
can challenge our presumed self-evident certainties. in this way he alerts us to the im-
portance of the encounter with otherness and difference in fuelling a situated learning 
process that can transform our whole way of thinking, and hence to the importance of 
respecting and preserving difference at every stage of our critical endeavours, instead 
of ignoring or suppressing it in the push toward consensus as more traditionally minded 
theorists tend to advocate. 
especially noteworthy for present purposes, foucault makes a decisive contribu-
tion to refining our appreciation of the conditions needed to underwrite the potentially 
transformative advancement of understanding by radicalizing our understanding of the 
constitution of the forums of intersubjectivity in which our knowledge claims must be 
critically appraised in a postfoundationalist context. to appreciate the nature and ex-
tent of foucault’s contribution in this regard, it is necessary to recognise the challenge 
he poses to the presumed need to remain answerable to some superordinate legislative 
standpoint as a prerequisite for effective critique, in favour of vindicating the critical 
potential inherent in holding our knowledge claims open to ongoing critical appraisal in 
diverse localised forums of intersubjectivity.70 in this connection, what warrants atten-
tion in particular is that although he has been criticised for not conforming to an ideal-
ised Kantian ‘tribunal acceptable to all free, reasoning beings’,71 foucault’s avowed aim 
is to challenge the idealised, homogenising presuppositions that underpin the notion of 
a Kantian tribunal or a Habermasian ‘universal audience’ in favour of valorising the 
need to defend our knowledge claims in diverse, situated and conflicted forums in in-
teraction with others who occupy very different discursive standpoints.72 in the present 
context suffice it to note that foucault’s eschewal of the need to appeal to an idealised 
Kantian or Habermasian ‘tribunal’ is epitomised by his celebrated valorisation of ‘sub-
jugated knowledges’, wherein he highlights the importance of contesting ‘the coercion 
of a theoretical, unitary, formal and scientific discourse’ so as ‘to emancipate historical 
knowledges from that subjection, to render them, that is, capable of opposition and of 
     69. see further Paul Healy, ‘a “limit attitude”: foucault, autonomy, Critique’, History of  the Human Sciences 
14 (2001), especially pp. 51-53. 
     70. for a more extended analysis of this theme, see further my Rationality, Hermeneutics and Dialogue, 
especially pp. 68-70.
     71. see James schmidt and thomas wartenberg, ‘foucault’s enlightenment’, in Critique and Power, ed. 
Michael Kelly (Cambridge, Ma: Mit Press, 1994), especially pp. 306-307.
     72. see further Hoy and McCarthy, Critical Theory, especially pp. 268-69.
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struggle’ against precisely that kind of ‘coercion’.73 thus, in place of an idealised, acon-
textual forum of intersubjectivity purged of the influences of situatedness and difference, 
what achieves prominence on a foucauldian analysis is the inherently pluralistic, decen-
tred and contested character of these forums.74 Correlatively, the need for appeal to an 
idealised ‘tribunal’ is rendered altogether otiose when it becomes clear that the intended 
aim can be achieved in a manner commensurate with the parameters of our postfoun-
dationalist situation by liberating the critical potential inherent in the encounter with 
difference in diverse localised forums of discourse. 
Valorising the merits of this foucauldian alternative’, David Hoy points out that 
instead of a ‘contextless’ abstraction like that of an idealised universal audience, ‘what 
opens assertions to critical evaluation are more empirical events, such as finding some 
conflicting evidence, encountering someone who disagrees’.75 on a foucauldian analy-
sis, then, we come to recognise that since ‘we ourselves are the judges’, we can forego 
appeal to ‘some ideal panel of judges’ in favour of continually re-examining our prejudg-
ments and interpretations ‘against other evidence and other interpretations’ in diverse, 
localised forums of intersubjectivity.76 Moreover, since direct engagement with others 
who occupy different discursive standpoints can provide all the critical potential we 
need (or could have), we lose nothing by replacing the presupposition of a universal 
audience with the injunction to hold our knowledge claims open to critical scrutiny in 
an open-ended series of pluralistic and decentred forums of intersubjectivity.77 on the 
contrary, since the encounter with otherness and difference can fuel a transformative 
learning process, eschewal of the homogenizing presupposition of a ‘universal audience’ 
or Kantian tribunal in favour of a commitment to remaining open to learning from 
the encounter with difference represents a gain rather than a loss in critical efficacy. 
indeed, since the encounter with otherness has the ability to function as a ‘contrastive 
foil’ which can cause us to take note of, and reassess, entrenched presuppositions we 
may not even have been aware of holding, it has a greater potential to fuel a process of 
transformative learning than what could be achieved under the aegis of an idealized, 
     73. Power/Knowledge (new york: Pantheon, 1980), p. 85.
     74. on this aspect of foucault’s stance, see further Joseph Rouse, ‘foucault and the natural sciences’, in 
Foucault and the Critique of  Institutions, eds J. Caputo and M. yount (university Park, Pa: Penn state Press, 
1993), pp. 153-61; also his ‘Power/Knowledge’, in The Cambridge Companion to Foucault, ed. gary gutting 
(Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1994), especially pp. 110-13.
     75. Hoy and McCarthy, Critical Theory, p. 268.
     76. Cf. Critical Theory, p. 269.
     77. notably, too, this assessment has been reinforced by Calvin schrag who observes, in foucauldian 
vein, that, criticism is a situated practice ‘through which the linkages and disjunctions among the various 
configurations of thought and action that define our historical situatedness are recognized and evaluated 
in an ongoing process of comparison, contrast, discernment of similarities and differences, and tracing of 
practical consequences’: The Resources of  Rationality (bloomington: indiana university Press, 1992), p. 257. 
Moreover (ibid.), to achieve this one need not step outside of one’s local context, intent upon attaining a 
transcendental, universal, [or] unconditioned standpoint. the resources for criticism reside in our ability 
to shuttle back and forth between received beliefs, points of view, theories, and institutional practices–
testing each against the putative merits of the other–without settling on any particular one of them as the 
untarnished truth of the matter.
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homogenized Kantian tribunal or a Habermasian ‘universal audience’. nor is anything 
lost by abandoning the presupposition of idealised consensus inherent in the Kantian/
Habermasian ideal. on the contrary, once we forego the notion of accountability to an 
idealised and homogenised Kantian/Habermasian tribunal in favour of endorsing the 
critical potential inherent in the to-and-fro movement characteristic of the encounter 
with difference, we come to recognise that, as georgia warnke perceptively puts it,78 
‘each interpretive stance may retain its distinctiveness; it can also help to develop and 
enrich the others and, in turn, be developed and transformed by them’, without antici-
pating an idealised resolution of differences. by thus apprising us of the gains in trans-
formative learning that accrue in virtue of the stimulus this provides for ‘enlarging one’s 
interpretations, and enriching them by holding them open to other interpretations’,79 a 
foucauldian analysis alerts us to the potential for transformative learning that inheres 
in the encounter with difference without the need for recourse to an idealised tribunal. 
in provoking us to reconceptualise both the nature of critical inquiry and the conditions 
under which it must operate in a postfoundationalist context, engagement with foucault 
has an invaluable contribution to make toward extending and refining our appreciation 
of its constitutive features. in particular, it alerts us to the merits of eschewing a preoc-
cupation with the validation of proffered claims in favour of embracing an inherently 
problematising approach, oriented toward testing the boundaries of what is currently 
considered to be beyond question. Correlatively, it challenges a perceived need to hold 
our knowledge claims accountable to a superordinate legislative tribunal in favour of 
holding them open to ongoing critical appraisal in diverse, localised forums of intersub-
jectivity. Moreover, in alerting us to the inherently pluralistic, decentred, and contested 
character of these forums, it eschews a one-sided emphasis on consensus in favour of 
valorising the transformative advancement of understanding. 
but notwithstanding the extent of foucault’s contribution to our core project in 
these respects, on further reflection it becomes apparent that his problematising project 
lacks two features which emerged as important in the course of our engagement with 
Habermas and gadamer, specifically, the need for a context-transcendent, regulative 
truth standard capable of giving impetus and direction to our situated inquiries and a 
well-regulated dialogical procedure for the argumentative appraisal of proffered claims 
with the capacity to underwrite potentially transformative shifts in understanding. in 
this connection, what is of primary importance in the present context is to conclude our 
brief analysis of foucault’s contribution by indicating why it is that, far from absolving 
us from meeting these requirements as is sometimes maintained, the endorsement of an 
inherently problematising and transformative conception of inquiry on foucault’s part 
actually serves to reinforce their indispensability.80 thus in the first instance, although 
it has not infrequently been contended that foucault’s valorisation of a plural concep-
     78. Justice and Interpretation (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), p. 132; cited in Hoy and McCarthy, Critical 
Theory, pp. 260-61.
     79. Cf. Hoy and McCarthy, Critical Theory, p. 264.
     80. for a more extended analysis of this theme, see further my Rationality, Hermeneutics and Dialogue, 
especially pp. 77-79.
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tion of truth enables him to dispense with the need for a robust context-transcendent 
truth standard, on closer analysis, it becomes clear that this is not in fact the case. in 
essence, this is because in the absence of such a standard we lack a key resource needed 
to determine which of the multiple knowledge claims emanating from diverse sites are 
worth learning from and which are not, and hence an indispensable feature needed to 
underwrite a process of transformative learning of the sort valorised by foucault him-
self. in addition, as noted in connection with gadamer, a context-transcendent truth 
standard is needed to fulfil the important integrating function of establishing an internal 
link between the range of valid viewpoints on a given subject matter. and in foucault’s 
case such an integrating focus is all the more necessary to minimize the threat of frag-
mentation that inevitably accompanies the incautious celebration of an irreducible plu-
ralism of truths. Moreover, because integral to the very logic of inquiry, it is difficult to 
maintain that foucauldian critique could be absolved from meeting this requirement, 
or that it constitutes an instance of ‘‘enlightenment blackmail’ to require that it does so. 
the cogency of this assessment is reinforced by the fact that, contrary to what is some-
times supposed, not only does foucault not actively reject the legitimacy of context-
transcendent universals like truth,81 on occasion he goes so far as to directly valorise the 
search for truth as an integral feature of a situated process of principled inquiry worthy 
of warranting our epistemic allegiance.82 accordingly, we may conclude that far from 
negating the need for a context-transcendent truth standard, engagement with foucault 
effectively serves to reinforce its indispensability.
a similar verdict is apposite in respect of the need to incorporate an integrated rule-
governed procedure for the principled comparative evaluation of inputs from diverse 
standpoints, with the capacity to fuel a principled process of situated transformative 
learning. Here again, contrary to what is sometimes contended, this requirement cannot 
readily be dispensed with on the basis of an appeal to some distinctive feature of post-
foundationalist critique of the sort foregrounded by foucault. in particular, foucault’s 
nietzschean commentators notwithstanding, it is noteworthy that, neither the activity 
of problematization nor its potentially transformative outcomes can qualify as self-vali-
dating.83 nor is openness to otherness in itself sufficient to ensure the critical efficacy of 
problematising inquiry, even when full account is taken of the pluralistic, decentered and 
contested character of postfoundationalist forums of intersubjectivity to which foucault 
specifically alerts us. on the contrary, under these conditions and in the absence of a 
superordinate legislative tribunal, the need for the specification of such an integrated 
rule-governed procedure becomes all the more necessary. Here again, this is because 
without the requisite argumentative procedures for establishing which contributions are 
worth learning from and which are not, we would lack a key resource for underwriting 
     81. see further Michael Kelly, ‘foucault, Habermas, and the self-Referentiality of Critique’ (in Critique and 
Power, especially pp. 382-89), where Kelly points out that foucault’s aim is not to deny the validity of universals 
like truth, but rather to highlight their historicity and deconstruct their presumed unconditionality.
     82. see especially ‘Polemics, Politics, and Problematizations’, in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow 
(new york: Penguin, 1984), pp. 381-82.
     83. see further Healy, ‘a “limit attitude”’, pp. 59-60.
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the transformative advancement of understanding, a regulative orientation prefigured 
by the whole thrust of foucauldian critique itself. indeed, given a concern with rational-
ity, the satisfaction of this requirement too emerges as non-negotiable since it is only on 
this basis that we could have good reason to believe that any advance in understanding 
was the result of a principled process of ‘integration and appropriation’ rather than a 
merely arbitrary, and correspondingly groundless, shift in our way of thinking. nor can 
the need to meet this requirement easily be dismissed as a mere external imposition 
or as an instance of ‘enlightenment blackmail’, given that again n a late work foucault 
explicitly endorses the need for a principled procedure of just this sort as indispensable 
for underwriting the integrity of a well-structured, truth-conducive process of inquiry.84 
Hence, here again, it can legitimately be concluded that, far from negating the need for 
this requirement, engagement with foucault serves to confirm its status as integral to 
the very logic of inquiry,85 thereby effectively reinforcing its non-negotiable status in a 
postfoundationalist context.
in conclusion, then, it is noteworthy that while recasting the terms in which the 
problem is construed, the foregoing analysis serves to confirm the widespread percep-
tion that foucauldian critique lacks the full panoply of resources needed to underwrite 
its transformative aims. furthermore, since the contributions of all three are needed to 
correct for the limitations of each individually, the foregoing analysis reinforces the ad-
vantages of the reading these theorists as complementary rather than as oppositional in 
the interests of formulating a viable postfoundationalist stance. specifically with regard 
to our core project, while much work clearly remains to be done in consolidating the 
constitutive features that have been identified into a cohesive ground plan, it is hoped 
that the present paper has gone some ways towards vindicating the legitimacy and mer-
its of a dialogically-oriented conception of rationality and critical inquiry as a worth-
while postfoundationalist template, and hence as an appropriate focus for the renewed 
contemporary debate about these fundamental philosophical topics.
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